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1. Introduction
The emphasis on experience in western philosophy has waxed
and waned. It was close to dying out in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, but is currently in the midst of a resurgence—to such a degree
that emphasizing this fact has of late come to be a bit of a cliché. But
recent efforts to resurrect a philosophical notion of experience, over-
played or not, are motivated by an important concern and have special
importance in the history of philosophy and the history of ideas more
generally: they testify to a collective reaction against the inherited pre-
suppositions of the twentieth century’s linguistic turn. As David Carr
notes in the introduction to Experience and History, the turn to lan-
guage occurred in both analytic and continental traditions around the
same time, though for largely separate reasons.1 One area of philosophy
in which experience has had a major influence, on both sides of the
divide, is in work concerned specifically with history.2
For these reasons, we should expect a contemporary work in the phi-
losophy of history that focuses on the concept of experience to be useful
not only for those interested in this oft-neglected sub-discipline, but
also for the current rethinking of broader philosophical categories and
problems—including the continental/analytic divide—after the linguistic
turn. On this front, Experience and History does not disappoint.
Like Carr’s other books, the work displays depth of analysis, but it
also offers a welcome synthetic breadth—a willingness to draw from a
wide array of sources in and beyond the phenomenological tradition in
order to address broader philosophical problems in a style that
nonetheless manages to be light, quick, and a pleasure to read. In a
philosophical era too often plagued by hyper-specialization and weighed
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down by jargon, this breadth is at once refreshing and revealing of the
progress that can be made by those willing to think about old problems
from fresh perspectives.  
Carr’s various phenomenological perspectives on the historical world
are developed through a mix of historical exegesis, original phenomeno-
logical analyses, and engagements with the ideas of contemporary
authors working on similar themes. The eight chapters of the book
hang together as a coherent whole, although as the subtitle indicates,
they are not organized into a single overarching argument but instead
take on a common theme from several different angles. This review
essay will focus on the intersections of a few of these angles in an effort
to summarize key ideas, situate them in the literature, and respond to
them with an eye to the problematic I find to be most important: the
relationship between the historicity of experience, meaning, and represen-
tation. Toward the end of the book, Carr notes similarities and differences
between his own account of narrative and that of Paul Ricoeur, present-
ing his own ideas as offering “a slight difference of perspective that is
worth underlining, such that my account constitutes, I hope, a useful
complement to Ricoeur’s” (EH 230). My goal will be to complement
Carr’s book in a similar manner: I will examine some of his major
claims, express a few reservations, and lay out some slight differences
in perspective, in the hopes of providing overall a “useful complement”
to Carr’s work—though I am, in broad outlines, very much in agree-
ment with his central claims.
2. Minding the Gap
Theories of history have long been framed in terms of a “gap”: as pro-
fessional historians, but also as laypersons interested in the pasts of
our families, cultures, and traditions, we are fascinated as well as frus-
trated by the irreducible distance between our lives today and that
which we wish to access in our past. When we pursue historical
research, read a piece of historical writing, or even watch a popular
history documentary on television, we are taking part in movements of
thought that seek—with differing degrees of complexity and self-reflec-
tion—to close that gap. In recent work in the philosophy of history,
efforts to close this gap have been constructed in line with two major
theoretical preoccupations: representation and memory. Carr’s book
begins from the premise that while each of these topics is undoubtedly
important, their framing in terms of the gap problematic poses an ulti-
mately unhelpful obstacle.
Carr’s motivating idea is that a properly framed account of experi-
ence can be used to move beyond such an irreducible gap between pre-
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sent and past by insisting on the historical character of experience itself.
If the historical is a central component not only of the past but of our
very experience of the present (what the phenomenological tradition
calls “historicity”), then the problem of minding the gap is resolved, or
perhaps better, dissolved, since it will have been shown that there was
really no such problem in the first place. This starting point in history’s
rootedness in experience will have the additional benefit, Carr tells us,
of securing a platform for a more robust theory of history that takes
account not only of historical knowledge or historical writing (the tradi-
tional concerns of philosophers of history in the period of the linguistic
turn), but also of the historicity Carr insists is characteristic of human
individual and communal life and projects themselves.
The first task, then, is to get clear on what exactly is meant by that
philosophically problematic concept, ‘experience’. For while the term
has certainly rebounded in prominence recently, it is not clear that it
has benefitted from any corresponding increase in definitional rigor. To
this end, in the first chapter, Carr broadly surveys several senses of
the term ‘experience’ that have been prominent in western philosophy
since the time of British empiricism, culminating in the present-day
resurgence of the notion after it was downplayed in the middle of the
twentieth century amidst the critiques of empiricism and foundational-
ism (for example, in Sellars and Quine). 
Carr identifies four rough notions of experience, two of which are
central for his account: 
1. The “innocence” of Locke’s sensations, Hume’s impressions, and
Kant’s first sense of Erfahrung. To this we can add, without too
much distortion, Erlebnisse in Dilthey and Husserl, provided they
are decoupled from their foundational role in epistemology.
2. The temporally extended and cumulative sense of experience
found in Hume, along with its negative and dialectical version in
Hegel, and Dewey. (EH 30)3
Just as the first sense corresponds roughly with the notion of Erlebnis,
the second will be recognizable to scholars of nineteenth- and twenti-
eth-century German philosophy as that of Erfahrung. The distinction
and relation between them also figures prominently—though without
such wide-ranging discussion of its historical pedigree—in Carr’s ear-
lier work.4 With this distinction in place, Carr claims that “[t]he key to
the relevance of experience for the philosophy of history lies in an
understanding of how consciousness of the past, and consciousness in
and of the present, are related, and this is really the question of how
the two forms of experience [senses one and two] are related” (EH 33).
3
RUMP/ ON CARR’S EXPERIENCE AND HISTORY
Carr’s brief detour through the modern period also allows him to
trace the origins of a broader systematic concern regarding the legacy
of epistemology and foundationalism—a concern that lies in the back-
ground throughout the book. Modern philosophy sees the mind’s rela-
tion to the world as presenting yet another “gap” problem: we need to
be able to explain the unbridgeable distance between our supposedly
subjective, “inner” minds and a supposedly real, objective world “out
there.” Already stuck within our heads, as it were, we are then con-
fronted with a further gap between ourselves and others, which
becomes the “problem of other minds.” The desire to overcome these
gaps led thinkers from Locke and Kant to the logical empiricists to
assign to experience in Carr’s first sense of the term the foundational
role of defining the scope and limit of our knowledge claims. 
This role for experience began to be rejected around the middle of
the twentieth century in the anti-foundationalist critiques of figures
such as Quine, Sellars, and Kuhn and—across the Atlantic—by the
early waves of poststructuralist thought in figures such as Barthes,
Derrida, and Foucault. And it is no historical accident that the rise of
anti-foundationalism corresponded with the apogee of the twentieth-
century’s turn to language, since “it is language that is thought to get
in the way of anything like pure experience and to impose on it a con-
ceptual framework” (EH 26). For Carr, however, the (justified) rejec-
tion of foundationalism has (unjustifiably) thrown the baby out with
the bathwater: if experience does not play a foundationalist role in epis-
temology, the problematic argument goes, it must play no meaningful
role at all, and thus it can be safely ignored as yet another outdated
concept, which allows philosophers (continental and analytic alike) to
turn their attention to “talk about language, language use, the concep-
tual schemes that go with it, etc., because that is where the focus of
epistemology now lies” (EH 27). Accounts of knowledge, it would seem,
may focus on experience or on representational structures such as lan-
guage, but not on both. Twentieth-century philosophers clearly chose the
latter. (I’m not convinced about Carr’s assessment of current epistemology
as focused so narrowly on such issues—a point I will return to below.)
Carr’s rebuff of this rejection of experience is ultimately neither logi-
cal nor historical, but phenomenological: that we have experiences and
that they matter in our lives is not in the last analysis something to be
established via argument; while non-foundational, it is still a certain
sort of given (EH 138).5 The need to account for the role and structure
of experience is not a rational requirement for epistemology but an
obvious task for the philosopher that is itself experienced and even felt
(EH 32). Phenomenology, beginning with Husserl, has moved beyond
the foundationalist quagmire, for Carr, by shifting focus from episte-
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mology to the theory of mind (EH 40–1). While phenomenology main-
tains the focus on experience characteristic of modern empiricists and
rationalists, it does so not out of concern for knowledge in a founda-
tional sense—out of a need to overcome perceived gaps—but because of
an insistence on something it takes to be more fundamental: the perva-
siveness of mind or consciousness in our projects and our meaning-
making. It is for these reasons that Carr insists on a “decoupling” of our
understanding of the first sense of experience he identifies from its
association with foundationalism and primarily epistemological concerns. 
Carr is certainly right to emphasize the importance of phenomenol-
ogy’s turn to the theory of mind and consciousness. One of the unique
strengths of phenomenology in the contemporary philosophical land-
scape is that it offers the resources of a widely developed systematic
philosophy that never fully embraced the linguistic turn, in the sense
that it remained interested in the phenomena of lived experience and
skeptical of exclusively linguistic or conceptual forms of analysis. As is
well known, in his later, transcendental phenomenology Husserl even
went so far as to distinguish a separate, non-linguistic conception of
meaning.6 Indeed, it can even be argued that the later Husserl’s account
of the pre-given Sinnesfundament of the lifeworld constitutes a version
of foundationalism in a different sense, one that remains innocent of
the problems that were seen to infect other major versions of it in the
twentieth century, because the main purpose of this analysis was not
epistemological, in the traditional sense, but transcendental—i.e., it
was concerned with the structure of meaning-constitution.7 In an envi-
ronment in which the main focus of theoretical philosophy has shifted
from language to mind, and in which there is increased interest in
things like non-conceptual content, contemporary philosophers of all
stripes would do well to pay greater attention to the rich resources phe-
nomenology has to offer.8 Carr does an important service in drawing
our attention to the as-yet underexplored historical dimension of this
precursor to contemporary work in the philosophy of mind.
But while in his endorsement of anti-foundationalism and his appeal
to experience as a given he stands in well-established phenomenologi-
cal territory, Carr’s characterization of phenomenology and of his own
position as “moving away from epistemology to something else” (EH 74)
needs a more robust defense. It is well known that the phenomenological
tradition was conceived by Husserl as a sort of logical and epistemologi-
cal project, a position that he continued to hold even after the “historical
turn” of his later works.9 And while it is clear that phenomenology’s inter-
ests cannot be understood as exclusively epistemological—especially in the
excruciatingly narrow and technical sense the term has taken on in some
post-Gettier analytic work—it is not clear that a truly phenomenological
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inquiry can be so simply divorced from epistemological concerns in
favor of “something else.” This is because of the central place that phe-
nomenology (especially the transcendental phenomenological tradition
Carr has endorsed in previous work)10 accords to the consideration of
meaning, even going so far as to consider it a precondition for claims
about knowledge or truth. By focusing on meaning in this broader
sense, phenomenology forces us to rethink presuppositions concerning
the relationship between reality, representation, and knowledge. But
precisely because of this rethinking, it seems to me it cannot be said to
move away from epistemology; phenomenology instead calls for the con-
stant revision of epistemology. The goal, at least for Husserl (we might
argue the case is different for ostensibly more pragmatically oriented
thinkers such as Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty), is still theoretical: while
the need to account for experience may originally be felt, the phe-
nomenological account that we are thereby inspired to give is surely
supposed to be a form of knowledge. And if we have rejected founda-
tionalism, the question of how such knowledge arises on the basis of
the constitution of meaning—especially outside representationalist pre-
suppositions—is itself always up for revision as part of the inquiry.
Epistemological inquiry is in this sense a necessary component of phe-
nomenology’s infinite task and, in the later work, a part of the ongoing
analysis of meaning-constitution. In this sense, it is not something we
can simply move away from.
Thus, unlike Carr, I am inclined to see epistemology, at least of the
phenomenological sort,11 as another baby to be rescued alongside expe-
rience rather than thrown out with the foundationalist bathwater.
Further attention to how we come to know our experience as meaningful
may allow us to sketch more fully the deeper historical level of experi-
ence that Carr’s book succeeds in pointing us toward. Or so I will
attempt to show in the remainder of this essay.
3. Experience, Representation, and Meaning
In the second half of the twentieth century, the sense of experience as
immediate and content-giving (i.e., the first sense of experience in
Carr’s delineation) has “fallen on hard times” (EH 27) and been threat-
ened to the point of (near) abandonment, as if, after the critiques of
foundationalism and the “myth of the given,” for all philosophical
intents and purposes experience itself no longer existed. Against this
trend and in line with the recent resurgence of interest in experience
noted above, Carr makes clear that his account of history is interested
not only in past things and facts, but also and indeed primarily in the
experiential phenomena of events, actions, and persons (EH 3–4).
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When we take off our theoretical hats as philosophers and historians
and think about the phenomenon of history as part of our everyday
lives, it is these themes, which are associated primarily with human
experience, that history really seems to be about. In this turn away
from language and toward experience, Carr’s work is of a piece with
something of a new trend in the philosophy of history. To see what is
distinctive about Carr’s phenomenological approach to these issues, it
will be useful to situate his claims vis-à-vis two of his major interlocu-
tors in this field, Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, each of whose
work Carr insists “is not incompatible with and may even be said to
complement” his own (EH 67).
Ankersmit’s 2005 book introduces the notion of “sublime historical
experience”12 explicitly in reaction to the problematic overemphasis on
language, which he sees arising largely from the poststructuralist turn
to narrative in the philosophy of history ushered in by Hayden White
(SHE 36). Ankersmit frames this as a worry about whether the histo-
rian can escape the “prisonhouse of language” in order to actually
access the past:13
Can we rescue the past itself from how we speak about it? More
specifically, can the historian enter into a real, authentic, and
“experiential” relationship to the past—that is, into a relationship
that is not contaminated by historiographical tradition, disciplinary
presuppositions, and linguistic structures such as identified by
Hayden White in his Metahistory of 1973? . . . [T]he crucial ques-
tion is whether it is (historical) experience that may enable us to
break through the walls of “the prisonhouse of language.” (SHE 4) 
Ankersmit’s answer, like Carr’s, is affirmative. As the passage sug-
gests, the notion of representationalism that Carr and Ankersmit object
to and that I refer to throughout this essay is one according to which
our experience of the world necessarily presupposes a mediating entity
that somehow mirrors objective reality in our subjective experiencing—
an entity commonly assumed, in the twentieth century, to take the
form of language or the signifier.14
Also like Carr, Ankersmit takes this idea of experience to demand a
more robust account of the role of the experiencing subject. In order to
rescue accounts of history from a naïve positivism that asks only for the
“objective facts” about what happened, we need to move toward a theory
that respects the subjective—that is, perspectival—view of the histo-
rian on the past she wishes to examine. Ankersmit’s appeal to sublime
historical experience is supposed to help us do this by simultaneously
overcoming a naïve positivism concerning history and the language-oriented,
representationalist presuppositions concerning our access to history
that—at least in the twentieth century—have often gone with it.
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And yet, despite these major similarities, Ankersmit’s notion of sub-
lime historical experience refers to a phenomenon we encounter subse-
quent to historical writing. For Ankersmit, the appeal to experience
functions within the context of a need to make sense of our experience
of the historical after the theoretical work attributed to the professional
historian: 
Only in a thoroughly historicized world, only after the past itself
and the historical subject have lost their contours and have been
reduced to being mere moments in a Gadamerian effective history,
only then will it be possible to break through the thick crusts of
effective history and meet history in its quasi-noumenal nakedness.
(SHE 277)
Since, on Ankersmit’s view, the Gadamerian concept of effective history
implies a reduction to the historian’s language (SHE 148), independent
of language there is in effect no level of historicity to be found: 
Historical experience is not the return to a state of primeval inno-
cence, to a state preceding all historical writing—it should be situ-
ated, instead, in a realm after or beyond all historical writing.
Sublimity enters the scene only after all has been said and done; it
has no affinity with beginnings, foundations, first principles, and
so on. (SHE 277; emphasis in the original)
In light of our discussion above, it is easy to appreciate the appeal of
such a claim: it takes the threat of a return to foundationalism off the
table immediately, since for Ankersmit the sublimity of historical expe-
rience will only be reached after the explicit representation of our his-
torical situation via effective history and thus after any foundation in
“primeval innocence” has been rendered inaccessible.
By contrast, Carr’s treatment of experience is seeking something
both more everyday and more original: “a connection to the past that is
prior to and independent of the historian’s interest and is shared by
all” (EH 32). Through this connection, he claims, “we may hope to
account for why we should be interested (as the historian is interested)
in the past in the first place” (ibid.). While he similarly wishes to con-
trast his position to foundationalism and to primarily epistemological
concerns, for Carr, experience is still first. The notion of experience
Carr seeks to highlight is not that which arises after the work of histor-
ical writing, but that which—when seen in a proper phenomenological
light—is there before. This notion of experience is itself a condition for
our historical fascination with the world, not only as historians but also
as appreciators of family genealogies, readers of history books, watch-
ers of documentaries, and citizens of nation-states with conceptions of
shared pasts and convictions about their continued relevance, for better
or for worse. Carr’s appeal to experience as a way in to the theory of
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history is thus more directly phenomenological: it seeks to understand
how in thinking about history our “sometimes grandiose theories arise
out of our experience of history—that is, our historicity” (EH 77). The
problem that Ankersmit invokes in terms of the “crust” of Gadermerian
effective history is then avoided by showing how, in effect, indepen-
dently of the work of the historian our everyday experience just is already
historical and thus already falls under the rubric of effective history.
The contrast is deepened by comparison with Ankersmit’s 2012 book,
Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation.15 Here
Ankersmit views representation in historical writing as a triadic rela-
tion consisting of (1) representation in (roughly) the conventional sense
discussed above; (2) the presentation or presented aspect of the thing;
and (3) the reality thereby represented (MTR 72). In contrast to tradi-
tional linguistic accounts, Ankersmit emphasizes the second notion and
carefully distinguishes it from the propositionally oriented model of
representation common in contemporary analytic philosophy. Historical
representation or meaning cannot be assimilated to linguistic represen-
tation à la Frege and the analytic tradition, but rather should be taken
as a “primitive term that cannot be defined in terms more basic than
itself—and that must therefore remain undefined—whereas other
notions, such as Fregean truth, reference, and meaning, can be derived
from it” (MTR 139). For Ankersmit, to take meaning as a primitive
does not mean to take it as a foundation in the epistemological sense.
His point is that meaning-claims have a certain explanatory precedence
over truth-claims, which should lead us to reject the Fregean strategy
“to somehow define meaning in terms of propositional truth and refer-
ence” (MTR 129). Meaning is a first term in the explanation, but not a
ground or foundation. 
This strategy of taking meaning as primitive conveniently allows
Ankersmit to bypass the problem of conventional (linguistic or proposi-
tional) representationalism with regard to historical experience. If we
insist that meaning—which in this case cannot be a matter of language
or propositions—cannot be further defined or analyzed, we also absolve
ourselves of the task of explaining how it is that our experience comes
to be meaningful or significant for us, or indeed why it is that we are
interested in the historical in the first place. As noted above, Carr’s
account of historical experience does seek to account for this.
If he does not simply wish to take the meaningfulness of historical
experience as an undefinable primitive, like Ankersmit, how does Carr
deal with the problem of representation? How exactly, on Carr’s view,
does the historicity of our immediate lived experience by its very nature
place us in the presence of that which is meaningful or significant?
Even if we accept on phenomenological grounds that historicity does do
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this, it seems as if Carr still owes us some account of how exactly this is
to occur outside of representational structures such as language. To put
the point differently, if “[t]he key to the relevance of experience for the
philosophy of history lies in an understanding of how consciousness of
the past, and consciousness in and of the present, are related, and this
is really the question of how the two forms of experience [senses one
and two] are related” (EH 33), how are we to characterize this relation
without appeal to a (representational) third term?
Carr’s answer to this question comes in the form of his account of the
narrative ontological structure revealed in experience itself. Whereas
Ankersmit’s 2012 account, which is focused primarily on historical writ-
ing, is explicitly non-ontological (MTR 72), Carr endorses an explicitly
ontological thesis that places experience prior to historical representa-
tion, not just retrospectively—in the sense that we must have had a
given experience in order to be able to subsequently represent it—, but
in the flow of lived experience itself. (I return to Carr’s account of narra-
tive in §5 of this essay.) Thus, while neither account is foundationalist in
the epistemological sense, Ankersmit’s approach to historical experience
and meaning is “top-down,” beginning from the category of historical
representation and using its logic to infer characterizations about the
status of the past “below” or “before” it, leaving the ultimate category,
meaning, undefined. Carr’s approach, by contrast, might be called “bot-
tom-up,” beginning from the narrative ontology of experience itself and
inferring or extrapolating a view of historical reality in accord with it. 
Eelco Runia, by contrast, while also noting the problems that arise
for representational accounts of historical reality, addresses the issue
by moving away from considerations of meaning entirely toward a focus
on what he calls “presence.”16 Runia explains presence by appeal to the
related notion of metonymy, which for him consists in a non-represen-
tational “transfer of presence” as opposed to the “transfer of meaning”
(P 29). For Runia, 
[W]hile a modern monument presents a past event in the here and
now, it can hardly be said to represent it. A monument like the
Berlin Holocaust Memorial is a repository of what haunts the place
of the present, a refuge for what has always (or at least since the
event in question took place) been there. It is closer to a relic than
to a painted, written, or sculpted pictorial account of what hap-
pened. . . . [W]hereas premodern, metaphorical monuments are pri-
marily engaged in a transfer of meaning, modern metonymical
monuments concentrate on a transfer of presence. . . . Because the
representationalist philosophy of history of the past decades was
geared to grasping how metaphor is instrumental in establishing
satisfactory representations, it could account for transfer of mean-
ing, but not for (metonymically achieved) transfer of presence. (P 17) 
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While Ankersmit’s 2012 account deals with the theoretical problem of
representationalism by distinguishing between propositional and pre-
sentational meaning, and guarantees the purity of the latter from lin-
guistic contamination by assigning it the status of a primitive, Runia
takes meaning to be necessarily representational, and simply abandons
it in accounting for history in favor of a notion of presence. This brings
him closer to a conception of historical experience in Carr’s sense—as
something that comes before the work of the professional historian and
reveals itself in the present.
Indeed, on the question of the role of experience, Runia is much
closer to Carr than is Ankersmit. Carr and Runia both presuppose the
notion of an “original experience” (EH 67). But Runia goes further,
insisting that
Below the surface of the text—in words and phrases we take for
granted when we speed along, in expressions we happily forgive the
historian, in the concepts and categories the author keeps so mas-
terfully in the air, in the proper and improper names that fill up
with color, sense, and meaning—below, I repeat, the surface of the
text—the things the metonymies stand for are still present. In
absence, but present. The words and phrases that have been woven
into the texture of the text are metonymically connected to the
places that are left behind—all the way down to the point where
names have been substituted for reality. (P 26)
In this insistence on something below the surface of the text, Runia
seems to flout longstanding critiques of the “metaphysics of presence.”
In his turn to the issue of presence, Runia is surely right to insist that
there is a level of significance evident in experience as a “stowaway”—
below that of representation, but also below the level of our consciously
chosen life-projects, activities, and intentions. But the stark contrast
he draws between presence and meaning seems phenomenologically
inaccurate in that it has the effect of abandoning the analysis of mean-
ing altogether. Are such presences not meaningful? And is it not this
meaningfulness or significance that—as Carr suggests—first draws us
to history?
If my claim above about the deep importance of a broad and not
exclusively linguistic conception of meaning for phenomenology is cor-
rect, it should give us reason to question Runia’s dismissal of meaning.
What Runia wants to call “presence” or “metonymy” might be better
described as non-representational meaning (taking representation in
the sense noted above). A suitably specified version of such a notion
would allow for the move beyond representationalist preconceptions
concerning history (a goal shared by Runia, Ankermsit, and Carr),
while still respecting its rootedness in the historical quality of our
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everyday experience, and while still overcoming the representational
gap that is the common target of these accounts. Such a conception
seems to me to be implied (though admittedly never directly stated) in
Carr’s simultaneous desire to remain wary of “recent and important
philosophical reflection on the ‘metaphysics of presence’” while still
insisting on the “reference of representation and memory back to expe-
rience” (EH 67). 
Like Ankersmit’s, Carr’s treatment of the gap problematic recognizes
the need to move beyond the representational structures of language.
And like Runia, he recognizes that such an account needs ultimately to
be rooted in a conception of experience prior to historical writing.
Contra Runia however, Carr’s analysis, in its focus on the everyday sig-
nificance of the historical, suggests that what is missing is still an
account of meaning in historical experience; the difference is that this
account is one in which the ties between it and things like representa-
tion and language have been problematized and rethought. But, as I
argue below, his account could go further in describing more precisely
the way in which this historical experience functions in concreto and
thereby how exactly meaning or significance comes into play at this
deeper level. 
4. Memory, Temporality, and Community 
Like representation, memory has become a central and much-contested
notion in recent work in the philosophy of history. If the historian’s
task is to establish knowledge about the meaning of past events,
actions, and persons, the capacity for memory is centrally involved. And
memory too implies a gap: in order to remember, we must to some
degree have forgotten—or at least ceased to actively notice—something
of significance.
This preoccupation was central, for example, in the French historian
Pierre Nora’s massive project in the 1990s of cataloguing French
“places of memory.”17 Nora explicitly seeks to overcome what he sees as
a lack of collective memory in the modern French consciousness. In the
face of this loss of “real memories,” Nora claims, we have developed
lieux de mémoire, sites that act in material, symbolic, and functional
ways to replace our “depleted fund of collective memory.”18 Here too
then there is a gap—in this case, one that arises due to a failure of col-
lective memory and one that is understood to be bridged in some way
by representation. Nora thus uses representation in roughly the sense
Runia rejects in favor of presence and metonymy. Representation and
memory are not only the major preoccupations of recent theories of his-
tory; they are also often deeply intertwined.
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Carr’s strategy for overcoming this difficulty, as with the case of rep-
resentation, is to base his account on something “closer” to our every-
day lives than the traditional notion of memory. If he can show that our
everyday lived experience is itself historical, and not only through the
mediation of explicitly represented memories, the perceived need to
overcome a gap by positing representational bridge notions such as
Nora’s lieux de mémoire is not so much met as it is rejected as a
pseudo-problem. With a suitable focus on the structure of our everyday
experience and its already-historical attributes, we will see that the
problem of the gap in the philosophy of history need not vex us in the
first place.
In this vein, Carr seeks to phenomenologically refine our conception
of memory’s relation to experience. Here, as in earlier works, he appeals
largely to Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness. The past functions in
experience not only through the recording of now-past perceptions, but
also in a broader and non-thematic way: the explicit function of memory
as recollection (e.g., when I representationally remember what I had
for breakfast yesterday) is contrasted with the phenomenon of reten-
tion, which provides the implicit (and non-representational) back-
ground or horizon from which my present experience arises on the
basis of my history, habits, etc. From the phenomenological standpoint,
retention is a condition of the possibility of recollection, not the other
way around (EH 72); it is “joined to the present, so intimately that it
plays a role in constituting the very sense of the present” (EH 37). 
Paralleling the recollection-retention distinction, protention—our
implicit anticipation of future experience—is contrasted with explicit
expectation about the future (e.g., our hopes, dreams, and worries).
Here again, the point is not that we have no representations of possible
future events, but that—from the standpoint of lived experience—such
explicit representations presuppose something more original and non-
representational. Past experiences thus shape our present experience
both explicitly, as expectations formed in concert with the representa-
tional contents of memory, and implicitly, due to the protentional struc-
ture of consciousness below the representational level (EH 47). As was
the case with representation, a careful study of memory in light of phe-
nomenological insights has led us back to the historicity of everyday
human experience through what Ankersmit called a “rescuing” of sub-
jective experience (SHE 4), but in a way that does not condemn our
historical understanding to the “prisonhouse of language.” 
In Carr’s case, however, this return is not simply subjective but first
and foremost intersubjective. Here Carr again follows the insights of
the phenomenological tradition: what is retained in retention, like what
is recollected, is not entirely—though it is partly—a result of free and
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autonomous individual choice. The “sedimentation” of meaning, as
Husserl’s late work emphasized, results from the social structures, tra-
ditions, etc., that shape my experience and my everyday life, as well as
from structures of my individual subjectivity. Thus, alongside the
extension of an account of memory and expectation to include the tem-
poral structure of retention-protention, Carr also argues for a stronger
conception of actions and motivations at the level of the collective or the
group. A phenomenologically accurate description of historical experi-
ence does not make sense as an exclusively individualistic one. The but-
tressing of an account of memory as explicit representation of past and
forgotten events with an account of the more orginary phenomenon of
retention is coupled with a shift from the individual subject to the com-
munal or “we-subject,” a continuation and enhancement of the phe-
nomenological emphasis on the first person to include the first person
plural (EH 50–1). This allows Carr to preserve and extend the central-
ity accorded by phenomenology to the intentionality of experience. The
world shows up as “a complex of meaningful things and events” (EH
43) not only individually but also—indeed primarily—collectively or
socially: I do not assume that the world of my experience is meaningful
only for me. It is in this light that Carr describes his project as “a phe-
nomenology of the interplay of points of view” (EH 197).
The appeal to the we-subject in turn sets the stage for what is one of
the most important, original, and provocative claims in the book. Carr
states unequivocally: “I want to contend that it is in the experience of
membership in communities that time is genuinely historical for us. As
a member of a community I become part of a We-subject with an expe-
rience of time that extends back before my birth and can continue even
after my death” (EH 52). Since the temporal-intentional structure of
the we-subject will mirror that of the individual subject, Carr contends,
this notion allows us to move beyond memory—even collective memory—
and grants us a form of access to history in the genuine sense, the sense
in which we speak of the history of societies, civilizations, and peoples.
For Carr, it is through this collective temporal-intentional structure
that we are confronted with the “peculiar intersubjectivity” (EH 60) of
historical events such as September 11, 2001, the 1989 fall of the Berlin
Wall, and the 2008 United States presidential election. In such cases,
“we didn’t need subsequent occurrences to know that these events were
historically significant. We knew it at the time and in and through the
experience itself” (EH 59). And it is of the utmost importance that each
of us understands this significance as recognized by us and not simply
by me: what is ultimately characteristic of the experience of historical
events, for Carr, is their significance for us collectively in the present,
which he insists is “not merely symbolic” but also “felt” (EH 61). 
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But here, it seems to me, the question again arises of how exactly
the historically meaningful comes into play outside the structures of
representation. If in the case of such historical events we are able to
access an historical significance that is at least in some cases not only
representational but also felt, then it seems as if we need to extend the
phenomenological conception of the individual experience of the “living
present” as felt and embodied to include a community form of feeling
and embodiment. Carr’s descriptive account of the experience of his-
tory should be extended not only to the we-subject but also to a commu-
nal notion of embodiment.
Admittedly, this is no easy task. While it is easy to envision an
account of an individual subject’s intentionality extending beyond or
below the level of representation by appeal to arguably more originary
embodied, non-representational structures such as affect or kinesthesis,
it is much more difficult to conceive of this analysis expanded to the
level of the we-subject. For our appeals to shared meanings or inten-
tionalities always seem to fall back on representational or semiotic
notions ultimately rooted in individual speakers or thinkers, even if
they often speak “with one voice.” Indeed, Carr’s analysis of we-inten-
tionality proceeds largely via evidence from linguistic usage: when we
say “we” (EH 50, 70) or “use the term ‘we’” (EH 52). Similarly, he
claims, “it is primarily as members of communities of various sorts that
we experience the reality of the past in our present lives. It is here that
such terms as ‘tradition,’ ‘inheritance,’ legacy,’ come into play” (EH 54;
emphasis added). If Carr has succeeded in extending his account of the
historicity of experience to the we-subject, it is not clear that he has
adequately explained how we can know the significance of historical
events in a present, direct and unmediated way, independent of the
gaps of representation or memory. Since their capacity to function non-
representationally was a major reason for Carr’s analysis of retention
and protention (as opposed to recollection and expectation), which con-
stitute the “level of temporality” at which he locates such historical
events, it seems the reader is owed a bit more here: linguistic usage may
provide good evidence for the existence of the we-subject, but it tells us
very little about the non-representational structure of we-intentionality.
The need for an account of embodied intentionality at the intersub-
jective level has been emphasized in recent phenomenological work
inspired by Husserl (especially his genetic phenomenology), on themes
such as personhood and social ontology. Timo Miettinen has recently
argued, for example, that “others are indeed there already at the ele-
mentary level of world-experience . . . not as objects to be constituted or
bodies to identify with but as the manifold of possible perspectives.”19
This recalls Carr’s own characterization of his book as “a phenomenol-
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ogy of the interplay of points of view,” but at the level of what Husserl
called “passive synthesis,” which occurs below the level of conscious,
representational awareness and is characterized primarily in terms of
functions of the lived body. 
Is Carr’s we-subject also embodied in a more substantial sense than
the mere “collective” embodiment of its individual members? It seems
that Carr should want to answer this challenge in the affirmative since
part of his point is that experience is a more originary structure than
representation and that the latter is not sufficient to fully account for
the former, at least in the case of history. Whereas Carr refers to the
“reference of representation and memory back to experience” (EH 67;
emphasis added), it might serve him better to speak of the “rootedness”
or “embeddedness” of these phenomena in a collective lived experience
that is, at its most originary level, already meaningful because it is
embodied.
5. Narrative and the Transcendental Structures of Historical
Experience
Closely related to the “genetic” considerations mentioned above, one of
the most important insights of Husserl’s later historical turn—a notion
taken up with various revisions and extensions by phenomenologists
after him—, was that we need a deeper transcendental account of
meaningful experience below representation and structures made
explicit to consciousness. Indeed, this is one way in which Husserl’s
work avoids the problematic presuppositions of the linguistic turn dis-
cussed above: for him, meaning is always first and foremost a category
of lived experience and only derivatively one of language or the concep-
tual. In the previous section I suggested some ways in which Carr’s
treatment of historicity—while it certainly takes account of this insight—
might make more of it by appealing to the lived body. Here I want to
focus on another area in which Carr’s book already moves in the direc-
tion of Husserl’s insights concerning meaning: his account of the narra-
tive structure of human experience. Further attention to this aspect of
Carr’s account will also allow me to return to some of the issues concern-
ing representation and language raised in §3 of this essay.
For Carr, narrative structure pervades even our lived experience of
time itself, since “experience of time is a function of the events that I
live through, the events, that is, that are meaningful or significant for
me. It is these events, not abstract points on a scale, that are ever
receding into an indefinite background and make up the horizon of my
past” (EH 179). Carr goes on to show how such horizons are organized
via the protention-retention structure at a primary level, and at a sec-
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ondary level by memory and explicit expectation. Together, “these pri-
mary and secondary horizons of past and future form the complex back-
ground against which the ‘now’ stands out and from which it derives its
significance” (ibid.). Given Carr’s objections against representational
and memory-based accounts of history, recollection and expectation
cannot themselves constitute our primary horizons because they pre-
suppose the very gap Carr’s appeal to the temporal primacy of the pro-
tention-retention structure is intended to overcome. 
But to say that the protention-retention structure provides us access
to historical significance is not yet to say how it does so. If, at this most
basic level of horizons, representation has not yet entered the picture,
how exactly does the “now” of our experience “derive its significance”?
How does meaning enter the picture here at all? 
Carr speaks to this issue in Experience and History through a renewed
focus on narrative—extending and correcting central claims from Time,
Narrative, and History.20 This earlier account, Carr tells us, took narra-
tive as the mediating term between historical writing and historical
reality (EH 69). This risked overshadowing Carr’s main point in the
earlier work—that historical writing and the sense-making undertaken
by the historical agent share a common formal structure—by “reifying”
the metaphor in a way that suggested that “a given historical narrative
simply reproduces a ‘real’ narrative already embedded in reality”
(ibid.). Carr’s earlier conception, we might say, remained too closely
tied to the problematic of representation. To correct for this, Carr now
insists that experience itself be taken as the mediating term between
historical writing and historical reality. Experience can be understood
on its own terms, outside the comparison to narrative, even if it “turns
out in its temporal structure to have narrative features” (EH 70). This
“ontologization of narrative,” or the “narrative mode of existence,” cor-
responds to a certain level of experienced reality—presumably, though
this is not always entirely clear, that which corresponds to the primary
level of horizons (EH 225). 
Carr’s “ontologization” of narrative—making it part of the structure
of experience itself—is supposed to help show how the historical char-
acter of experience is a necessary part of the “making sense” of the
world in general, and that this is simply what we, as human beings
and meaning-makers, do. Self-constitution is a form of self-narration—
an idea traceable to Dilthey’s appeals to autobiography and life-histories
(EH 228–9). This is the important insight of the later nineteenth- and
twentieth-century hermeneutic tradition: the focus on a process of self-
interpretation and “the discovery or revelation of meaning” (EH 227).
To put the insight in the terms of the early Heidegger, the act of (self)
understanding is itself constitutive of the being of Dasein; my meaning
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does not precede me. This ontological nature of narrative is revealed in
grasping the meaning of an action (as opposed to understanding as
grasping the meaning of an expression) and locating it in the “plot” of
our daily lives (EH 228). Carr thus embraces the Heideggerian and
Gadamerian claim to a transformation of hermeneutics from an episte-
mological to an ontological project, recognizing a fundamental struc-
ture of human being-in-the-world and thereby explaining why we are
interested in history in the first place (EH 77). Human actions, inten-
tions, etc., are always already “real in a sense that can never be
touched by metaphysical speculations—that is, they matter” (EH 208).
For Carr, this explains how the “now” of our experience “derives its signif-
icance” independent of representation: since “[a]ction does not exist inde-
pendently of its meaning” (EH 228), in effect it always already had it.21
To illustrate this idea, toward the end of the book, Carr presents an
extended analysis of a passage from Simon Schama describing Sir
Walter Ralegh22 planning an expedition. Carr writes:
Here Ralegh is presented as a human being in the human world.
His physical surroundings are not just impinging on him causally;
they have significance for him, a significance which is derived from
their relation to a long-term project in which he is engaged. In this
sense they are embedded in a story which Ralegh is projecting
before himself and which he will proceed to act out. This is the pri-
mary narrative which shapes the human time of Ralegh’s own past,
present, and future. It is this first-order narrative that Schama’s
second-order narrative is about. (EH 210–1)
In contrast to the conventional “secondary narrative” of the historian,
“primary” (or proto-) narrative corresponds to the level that Carr wishes
to “ontologize” in his account. 
But in his emphasis on narrative as an ontological category, it seems
to me that Carr too severely downplays what might be considered an
equally fundamental pre-condition of historical experience. Without
going so far as to endorse an ontology of “the event”23 or an account of
“spontaneous sense formation,”24 we might still think that there is much
more going on here “below the surface” of narrative that is missing from
Carr’s account, but which is still open to phenomenological description.
Carr’s notion of the primary level of narrative is closely tied to a con-
ception of agency, as we see in his focus in the passage above on
Ralegh’s intentions for his “project” and a story which he “projects
before himself” (EH 210–1). But there is surely something else at play:
without denying the ways in which the significance of Ralegh’s sur-
roundings “is derived from their relation to a long-term project in which
he is engaged” (EH 210), can we not also admit other factors that help
to determine this significance—factors not so easily attributed to the
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agent or his projects? What about the norms of masculinity and social
status that helped to shape the very projects Ralegh undertook and
even his choice of career? What about the material affordances made
possible by the technological advances of Ralegh’s day, e.g., the advent
of ships capable of long voyages such as that envisioned for the Guiana
expedition? It seems that there are other non-agential elements that
are determinant even of the rules or conditions of possibility for such
“first-order” agential sense-making—Carr’s “primary narrative.” And
this set of structures or determinants seem to be, in Husserl’s terms,
largely passive, not something actively constructed by the agent, even
in terms of possibilities, but rather in some more primordial sense,
determinant of what possibilities there might be.
Taken by itself, Carr’s account of historicity in terms of narrative
seems to me to imply an overly active understanding of the subject.
While it does manage to steer a middle course between determinism
and relativism, as Carr intends (EH 196), it does not do justice to the
background conditions that so extensively determine the narratives of
our lives. Capturing the full picture requires, in my view, a comple-
mentary perspective less directly oriented to consciousness and agency. 
Carr himself seems to have a similar worry and even makes clear
that his book is not intended to be merely an “agent’s intent” account:
“[t]elling the story of an action,” he explains, “involves more than just
finding the motive, thought, or intention behind the action: It ties the
action to its background circumstances, its antecedent events, and its
subsequent results” (EH 223). And yet, his subsequent account of these
“circumstances and events” consists primarily of an extension of the
agential account from the level of the ‘I’ to that of the ‘we’:
[I]n history, the “constitution” deriving from the narrative activity
of the historian is preceded by the narrative self-constitution of
social entities. One may be tempted by a certain idealism, since
some social entities seem to have been created or invented by his-
torical retrospection. . . . But even here, it is a question of reinter-
preting activities and events that had their original existence as a
first-order narration at the level of the social group. (EH 231;
emphasis added)
This is of a piece with Carr’s second proposed revision to his earlier
account of narrative. Alongside the ontologized conception of narrative, he
now argues that we need a more explicitly phenomenological, de-ontolo-
gized understanding of the we-subject involved, thus distancing his view
from an understanding of the we-subject as an independent objective
reality—as it might be understood, for example, in Hegel’s philosophy
of history—in favor of a view of we-subjects as “fragile entities that
form themselves in certain circumstances and just as easily dissolve
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when circumstances change” (EH 69). Carr thus extends the individual
conception of sense-making by means of his earlier emphasis on com-
munities and we-intentionality, resulting in a sort of “softening” of the
notion of agency by emphasizing its embeddedness in group narratives
and motivations: “It is not just the intended consequences of an action,
its plausible ‘outcomes,’ that make it comprehensible; it is the whole
sweep of its future horizon, from the agent’s point of view, the long-term
destiny of the individual or the group, which forms the ultimate frame
for the action” (EH 193; emphasis added). 
But does this move from the individual to the social level really go
far enough to allow us to make sense of the ways in which circum-
stances affect the historical structure of experience? If the we-subject is
itself formed and disbanded in part according to circumstances beyond
its purview, then surely it can no more fully determine those circum-
stances than can the I-intentionalities that make it up. Thus, in my
view, while it is a positive development, it does not go far enough to
extend the project of a “phenomenology of interplay of points of view” to
the social level (EH 197). For the interplay that is relevant here is also
an interplay with circumstances and things that have a significance
that is not entirely of my—or even our—making. The move from the
individual to the social level in terms of narrative structure extends
this problem to a new level, but it does not manage to fully solve it.
While the analysis of narrative as an ontological structure is certainly
revelatory, I’m not willing to go as far as Carr does in claiming that it is
“narratives all the way down” (EH 223).
This review essay is not the place to elaborate my own position con-
cerning what other, non-agential structures are involved in the struc-
turing of historical significance. But let me gesture very briefly in two
directions, each of which is hinted at in Carr’s account25 but in my view
underemphasized by contrast to the focus on narrative. 
First, consider the issue of normativity. At one point, Carr suggests
that narrative constitutes something like what the later Wittgenstein
calls a Lebensform (EH 229). This point of comparison is instructive.
While the exact interpretation is contentious, what Wittgenstein seems
to intend with this notion is a set of basic normative practices that
serve to undergird our common language-games.26 Carr characterizes
Husserl’s account of theoretical truths as concerned with questions and
problems that “do not come out of the blue, but out of a tradition of
ongoing inquiry,” whose “prior solutions furnish the context and back-
ground” (EH 49). With Wittgenstein, I would argue that this insight
applies not only to scientific enterprises but even to the normative prac-
tices that characterize our daily life. And conditions here are not exclu-
sively those determined by the narrative ontology of the (individual or
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collective) agent: the background context here will also include things
like the normative consistency of experience itself. In Wittgenstein’s
words, 
[I]f things were quite different from what they actually are—if
there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of
fear, of joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both
became phenomena of roughly equal frequency—our normal lan-
guage-games would thereby lose their point. The procedure of
putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the
turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that
such lumps suddenly grew or shrank with no obvious cause. (PI
142)
Though outside the purview of active agency, such practices as mea-
surement (or Wittgenstein’s more famous example of the speaking of a
language [PI 23]) help to normatively determine the possibilities for
our projects and narratives in that they provide certain conditions for
success or failure ultimately beyond our control.27 Even if the exact role
of representation (language-games) is different in Wittgenstein’s case,
this insight suggests the need for further consideration of the norms
that must be in place as a precondition for common historical experience.28
My second, related suggestion comes from the later Sartre. In his
discussion of the “peculiar intersubjectivity” manifest in the experience
of historical events, Carr makes reference to Sartre’s conception, in the
Critique of Dialectical Reason,29 of the “group-in-fusion” (EH 60). In
Sartre’s account of historicity and social ontology in this work, this
notion is intimately bound up with another notion—that which he calls
the “practico-inert”—which is the result of group intentionality and
activity, but which is manifested in material conditions that, often
because of their very materiality, are now alienated from and resist the
group.30 This seems to me especially important if we consider the
impact of technology on questions of history. Carr mentions television
as our main form of access to historical events such as September 11.
But even if we are able through this medium to experience historical
events in the present, as they are happening, doesn’t technology change
our access to these events in some way? What about social media, or
the 24-hour news cycle according to which everything seems to be
treated as a world historical event, at least until the public loses interest?
In order to account for such potential changes in our lived temporality,
we need to pay closer attention to the ways in which the products of we-
intentionality have themselves come to determine the structure of our
lived experience. If “the globalization of space and time in the contem-
porary world is not so much the triumph of the objective as it is the rise
of a new culture of space and time, still living uneasily with the old”
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(EH 183), we would do well to focus specifically on the structures
through which this new culture is manifested. And it is not clear to me
that such structures will be captured by an account of historical experi-
ence that hews too closely to the narrative dimension.
6. Conclusion
It should be noted before concluding that my examination of Carr’s
major claims has largely neglected his account of the “classical philoso-
phy of history” (chapter 4), his own “phenomenological re-reading” of it
(chapter 5), and perhaps most significantly, his exegesis of the origina-
tion of many of these ideas in the phenomenological tradition (chapter
6). As we should expect from a scholar who has engaged with these
ideas and authors for many years, these chapters are exemplary and do
much to support his main claims and to add historical and exegetical
justification to the ideas I have engaged exclusively on an argumenta-
tive level here. But I don’t think they obviate the critical complements I
have suggested. 
A final word on this will allow me to return to the broader considera-
tions from which this essay began. My suggested complements to Carr’s
account stem from a difference in perspective concerning the need to
move away from epistemology to considerations of mind and, in the
case of narrative, to ontology. Carr resists “conventional epistemology”
(EH 230) because he sees in it problematic remainders of a thoroughgo-
ing representationalism and of foundationalism, both of which—in
their traditional forms at least—he rightly seeks to reject. I have tried
to suggest, by contrast, that if meaning is at least in some sense to be
located directly in our experience with the world and not only in our
talk about it, then the project of explaining and not just asserting the
direct connection between experience and meaning demands a corre-
sponding clarification of the epistemic structure of historical signifi-
cance. “Founding” will mean something very different when taken in
this light. Indeed, Ricoeur himself, not in his work on narrative but in
his own Husserl exegesis, reminds us of just this point: for the later
Husserl, “founding no longer signifies elevating to intellectuality, but
on the contrary it signifies building up on the basis of the primordial, of
the pre-given.”31
If we reject the exclusivity of linguistic and conceptual models for
the explanation of experience, and ipso facto representational meaning,
epistemological questions no longer need to be suspended or avoided.
Carr is right that the historical significance of experience is ultimately
something “felt.” But if we are to write books and articles about it, we
should also attempt to describe as completely as possible how we come
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to know it. From this perspective, we are perhaps better off attempting
to answer anew, and not to reject, the epistemological questions that
arise in the landscape of twenty-first-century philosophy. Phenomenology
still offers powerful tools for such epistemological clarification and is
uniquely positioned for this task because its descriptive method is not
undertaken in fidelity to foundationalism or representationalism, but
instead to the everyday experiencing of significance; in this respect,
phenomenology takes its cue not only from the conscious subject but
also from other everyday manifestations of “the things themselves.” 
While his critical engagements with problems of representation are
far from the only merits of Carr’s considerations of experience and his-
tory, I have focused on them here because of the way they help to break
new ground. In a twenty-first-century characterized by increasing
doubts from all manner of continental and analytic philosophers con-
cerning the representational presuppositions of the twentieth century,
Experience and History illustrates the centrality of both phenomena
represented in its title for reaching more nuanced perspectives on our
shared, lived world.
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